Publications

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Papers published or accepted

Please note that the copyright belongs to the journals.

1.  Life-History Evolution and the Origin of Multicellularity,
R.E. Michod, Y. Viossat, C.A. Solari, M. Hurand and A. Nedelcu, Journal of Theoretical Biology 239, 257-272 (2006)

2. The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., Games and Economic Behavior 59, 397-407  (2007)

3. Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 27-43 (2008)

4. Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?,
Viossat, Y., Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 1152-1160 (2008)

5.  Time Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics,
J. Hofbauer, S. Sorin and Y. Viossat, Mathematics of Operation Research 34, 263-269 (2009)

6. Properties and Applications of Dual Reduction,
Viossat, Y., Economic Theory 44, 53-68 (2010)

7. Equilibrium Payoffs in Finite Games,
E. Lehrer, E. Solan and Y. Viossat, Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 48–53 (2011)

8. Evolutionary strategic beliefs and financial markets,
E. Jouini, C. Napp and Y. Viossat, forthcoming in Review of Finance,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs004

9. No-regret dynamics and fictitious play,
Y. Viossat and A. Zapechelnyuk, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003

Working papers / Documents de travail

3bis. Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y.,  S-WoPEc working paper 629, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm (2006)
(a more detailed version than the Mathematical Social Sciences article)

9bis. No-regret dynamics and fictitious play,
Y. Viossat and A. Zapechelnyuk, Working paper, 2012, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.0660.
(a more detailed version than the Journal of Economic Theory article)

WP1. The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games,
Viossat, Y.,  S-WoPEc working paper 641, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm (2006)

WP2. Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium,
Viossat, Y. cahier du laboratoire d'économétrie 2004-32,  Ecole polytechnique
(old version, the current version is chapter 9b or my Ph.D. dissertation)

WP3. Elementary Games and Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope has Full Dimension,
Viossat, Y., cahier du laboratoire d'économétrie 2003-30, Ecole polytechnique (2003)

WP4. Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies,
Viossat, Y., working paper, oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00636620 (2011)

WP5. Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., working paper, http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00756096, oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00756096 (2012)

Ph.D. dissertation's chapters unpublished otherwise / chapitres de la thèse non publiés sous une autre forme

D1. Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Nash Equilibria: a Universal Example, chapter 11 of my Ph.D. dissertation, (2005)

D2. Replicator Dynamics and Nash equilibrium in low dimension, chapter 9a of my  Ph.D. dissertation, (2005)

D3. Correlated Equilibrium in Generic Zero-Sum Games, chapter 4 of my  Ph.D. dissertation, (2005)

Ph.D. dissertation/ Thèse :  Correlated Equilibrium, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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