viossat@ceremade.dauphine.fr
Tel
: 0144054882
Bureau
: B618ter
Yannick Viossat est maître de conférence en mathématiques à l'université Paris-Dauphine. Après des études à l'Ecole polytechnique, il a effectué une thèse en théorie des jeux sous la direction de Sylvain Sorin, puis un post-doc à la Stockholm School of Economics. Membre du CEREMADE et membre associé du LEDa, il est éditeur associé du Journal of Dynamics and Games. Ses thèmes principaux sont les jeux d'évolution et leurs applications en économie et en biologie, et plus récemment la modélisation de nouvelles thérapies contre le cancer fondées sur des idées venant de l'écologie et de la biologie de l'évolution. Il a également travaillé, en théorie des jeux, sur les propriétés des équilibres de Nash et des équilibres corrélés.
Stein A., Salvioli M., Garjani H., Dubbeldam J., Viossat Y., Brown J., Staňková K. (2023), Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B - Biological Sciences, vol. 378, n°1876
Ashkenazi-Golan G., Tsodikovich Y., Viossat Y. (2023), I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions, Economic Theory, n°76, p. 1329–1362
West J., Adler F., Gallaher J., Strobl M., Brady-Nicholls R., Brown J., Roberson-Tessi M., Kim E., Noble R., Viossat Y., Basanta D., Anderson A. (2023), A survey of open questions in adaptive therapy: Bridging mathematics and clinical translation, eLife, vol. 12
Mertikopoulos P., Viossat Y. (2022), Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics, Journal of Dynamics and Games, vol. 9, n°4, p. 499-528
Noble R., Burri D., Le Sueur C., Lemant J., Viossat Y., Kather J., Beerenwinkel N. (2022), Spatial structure governs the mode of tumour evolution, Nature ecology & evolution, vol. 6, p. 207–217
Strobl M., West J., Viossat Y., Damaghi M., Robertson-Tessi M., Brown J., Gatenby R., Maini P., Anderson A. (2021), Turnover modulates the need for a cost of resistance in adaptive therapy, Cancer Research, vol. 81, n°4
Viossat Y., Noble R. (2021), A theoretical analysis of tumour containment, Nature ecology & evolution, vol. 5, p. 826-835
Cunningham J., Thuijsman F., Peeters R., Viossat Y., Brown J., Gatenby R., Staňková K. (2020), Optimal control to reach eco-evolutionary stability in metastatic castrate-resistant prostate cancer, PLoS ONE, vol. 15, n°12
Vigeral G., Viossat Y. (2016), Semi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary games, Operations Research Letters, vol. 44, n°1, p. 19-24
Mertikopoulos P., Viossat Y. (2016), Imitation Dynamics with Payoff Shocks, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, n°1, p. 291-320
Viossat Y. (2015), Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies, Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 3, n°1, p. 91-113
Viossat Y. (2014), Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria, Journal of Dynamics and Games, vol. 1, n°3, p. 537-553
Viossat Y., Zapechelnyuk A. (2013), No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148, n°2, p. 825-842
Jouini E., Napp C., Viossat Y. (2013), Evolutionary beliefs and financial markets, Review of Finance, vol. 17, n°2, p. 727-766
Viossat Y., Solan E., Lehrer E. (2011), Equilibrium payoffs of finite games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, n°1, p. 48-53
Viossat Y. (2010), Properties and applications of dual reduction, Economic Theory, vol. 44, n°1, p. 53-68
Hofbauer J., Viossat Y., Sorin S. (2009), Time average replicator and best reply dynamics, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 34, n°2, p. 263-269
Viossat Y. (2008), Is having a unique equilibrium robust?, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 44, n°11, p. 1152-1160
Viossat Y. (2008), Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 56, n°1, p. 27-43
Viossat Y. (2008), Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 44, n°11, p. 1152-1160
Viossat Y. (2007), The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 59, n°2, p. 397-407
Viossat Y., Michod R., Solari C., Nedelcu A., Hurand M. (2006), Life-History Evolution and the Origin of Multicellularity, Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 239, n°2, p. 257-272
Alvarez Borges F., Viossat Y. (2022), Tumor containment for Norton-Simon models, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 31 p.
West J., Adler F., Gallaher J., Strobl M., Brown J., Brady-Nicholls R., Robertson-Tessi M., Kim E., Noble R., Viossat Y., Basanta D., Anderson A. (2022), A survey of open questions in adaptive therapy : bridging mathematics and clinical translation, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 27 p.
Ashkenazi-Golan G., Tsodikovich Y., Viossat Y. (2020), I Want to Tell You?Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 26 p.
Viossat Y., Noble R. (2020), The logic of containing tumors, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 16 p.
Viossat Y. (2011), Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 20 p.
Viossat Y. (2006), Openness of the Set of Games with a Unique Correlated Equilibrium, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 17 p.
Viossat Y. (2005), Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of all Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria, Massy-Palaiseau, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, 13 p.
Viossat Y. (2004), Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium, Massy-Palaiseau, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, 12 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Elementary Games and Games whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope has Full Dimension, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 11 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 19 p.
Viossat Y. (2003), Properties of Dual Reduction, Paris, Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 28 p.