Cahiers du CEREMADE

Unité Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534
 
Abstract : We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. The characterization relies on the analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information.
 
 
COMMUNICATION EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS OF REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
RENAULT Jérôme, TOMALA Tristan
2000-34
13-09-2000
 
Université de PARIS - DAUPHINE
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