Cahiers du CEREMADE

Unité Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534
 
Abstract : The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We say that an equilibrium is completely revealing if it allows each player to learn the state of nature. Our aim is to describe the communication structures for which such an equilibrium exists for any payoff function. We consider thus an interaction in which players, facing some incomplete information about the state of nature, exchange messages while imperfectly monitoring them. We then ask the question: can players learn the true state even under unilateral deviations ? We give an answer by defining learning functions which describe what a player can learn by communicating repeatedly through the imperfect monitoring structure. To get effective learning in equilibrium, we require those functions to possess properties of robustness to unilateral deviations. We compute these functions explicitly for particular monitoring structures.
 
 
LEARNING THE STATE OF NATURE IN REPEATED GAMES WITH IMCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND SIGNALS
RENAULT Jérôme, TOMALA Tristan
2000-42
25-12-2000
 
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