Cahiers du CEREMADE

Unité Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534
 
Abstract : The aim of this paper is to study a notion of perfectness for communication equilibira in repeated games with signals, to characterize the corresponding set of equilibrium payoffs and finally to derive a Folk theorem.
 
 
Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
TOMALA Tristan
2005-5
28-01-2005
 
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