Cahiers du CEREMADE 

Unité
Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534 

Abstract : We consider a repeated game where at each stage players
simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the
less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the
same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only
the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game
has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this
game was considered by the authors, who proved a
folk theorem (2005). Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely
repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous
result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs
Hausdorffconverges to the feasible set as either the discount
factor goes to one or the number of repetition diverges to
infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game
is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria. We
consider a variation of the minority game with an extra player,
and we prove that private strategies allow to achieve in
equilibrium some Paretoefficient payoffs that public strategies
cannot achieve. 





200623 

24032006 

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