Cahiers du CEREMADE

Unité Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534
 
Abstract : This paper studies repeated games with public signals, symmetric bounded recall and pure strategies. Examples of equilibria for such games are provided and the convergence of the set of equilibrium payoffs is studied as the size of the recall increases. Convergence to the set of equilibria of the infinitely repeated game does not hold in general but for particular signals and games. The difference between private and public strategies is relevant and the corresponding sets of equilibria behave differently.
 
 
Repeated Games with Public Signal and Bounded Recall
RENAULT Jérôme, SCARSINI Marco, TOMALA Tristan
2006-8
21-02-2006
 
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