Cahiers du CEREMADE

Unité Mixte de Recherche du C.N.R.S. N°7534
 
Abstract : We study a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses simultaneously a sequence of actions, and the payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game where players are restricted to strategies implemented by finite automata. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of this game to the case of strategies with bounded recall.
 
 
Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
SCARSINI Marco, RENAULT Jérôme, TOMALA Tristan
2007-10
28-03-2007
 
Université de PARIS - DAUPHINE
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