Publications
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Please note that the
copyright belongs to the journals.
1. Life-History
Evolution and the Origin of Multicellularity,
R.E. Michod, Y. Viossat, C.A. Solari, M. Hurand and A. Nedelcu, Journal of Theoretical Biology 239,
257-272 (2006)
2. The Replicator
Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., Games and
Economic Behavior 59,
397-407 (2007)
3.
Evolutionary
Dynamics
May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., Mathematical
Social Sciences 56, 27-43 (2008)
4. Is
Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?,
Viossat, Y., Journal
of Mathematical Economics 44,
1152-1160 (2008)
5. Time
Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics,
J. Hofbauer, S. Sorin and Y. Viossat, Mathematics of Operation Research 34, 263-269 (2009)
7.
Equilibrium
Payoffs in Finite Games,
E. Lehrer, E. Solan and Y. Viossat, Journal
of Mathematical Economics 47,
48–53 (2011)
8.
Evolutionary strategic
beliefs and financial markets,
E. Jouini, C. Napp and Y. Viossat, forthcoming in Review of Finance,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs004
9.
No-regret dynamics
and fictitious play,
Y. Viossat and A. Zapechelnyuk, forthcoming in Journal
of Economic Theory, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003
Working papers / Documents de travail
3bis. Evolutionary Dynamics
May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., S-WoPEc working paper 629, Stockholm
School of
Economics, Stockholm (2006)
(a more detailed version than the
Mathematical Social Sciences article)
9bis.
No-regret dynamics and fictitious
play,
Y. Viossat and A. Zapechelnyuk, Working paper, 2012, available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.0660.
(a more detailed version than the
Journal of Economic Theory article)
WP1. The Geometry of Nash
Equilibria
and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games,
Viossat, Y., S-WoPEc working paper 641,
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm (2006)
WP2. Replicator
Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium,
Viossat, Y. cahier du laboratoire d'économétrie 2004-32, Ecole
polytechnique
(old version, the current version is chapter 9b or my Ph.D. dissertation)
WP3. Elementary Games and
Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope has Full Dimension,
Viossat, Y., cahier du laboratoire
d'économétrie 2003-30, Ecole polytechnique (2003)
WP4. Deterministic monotone dynamics
and dominated strategies,
Viossat, Y., working paper, oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00636620
(2011)
WP5.
Game
Dynamics and Nash Equilibria,
Viossat, Y., working paper, http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00756096,
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00756096
(2012)
Ph.D.
dissertation's chapters unpublished otherwise /
chapitres de la thèse non publiés sous une autre forme
D1. Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Nash Equilibria: a Universal Example, chapter 11 of my Ph.D. dissertation, (2005)
D2. Replicator Dynamics and Nash equilibrium in low dimension, chapter 9a of my Ph.D. dissertation, (2005)
D3. Correlated Equilibrium
in Generic Zero-Sum Games, chapter 4 of my
Ph.D. dissertation,
(2005)
Ph.D.
dissertation/ Thèse : Correlated Equilibrium, Evolutionary Games
and Population Dynamics
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